




CERNTRE DE RECHERCHE / RESEARCH CENTER
AVENUE BERNARD HIRSCH - BP 105
95021 CERGY-PONTOISE CEDEX FRANCE
TÉL. : 33 (0) 1 34 43 30 91
FAX : 33 (0) 1 34 43 30 01
Mail : research.center@essec.fr
GROUPE ESSEC,
ÉTABLISSEMENTS PRIVÉS D'ENSEIGNEMENT SUPÉRIEUR,
ASSOCIATION LOI 1901,
ACCRÉDITÉ AACSB - THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
FOR MANAGEMENT EDUCATION,
AFFILIÉ A LA CHAMBRE DE COMMERCE ET D'INDUSTRIE




-  DR 04001 -
E EX XC CE ES SS SI IV VE E   L LI IA AB BI IL LI IT TY Y   D DO OL LL LA AR RI IZ ZA AT TI IO ON N





*  D. BESANCENOT Université de Paris 2 , 92, rue  d’Assas, 75006 PARIS.
**  R. VRANCEANU ESSEC, Avenue B. Hirsch, BP 105, 95021 Cergy Pontoise Cedex, FranceEXCESSIVE LIABILITY DOLLARIZATION
IN A SIMPLE SIGNALING MODEL
Damien BESANCENOT and Radu VRANCEANU
ABSTRACT :
If a dollar denominated external debt comes with so many risks, why do emerging economies allow for
such an imbalance to accumulate ? The explanation provided in this paper builds on a simple signaling
model. By assumption, lenders have no direct possibility to infer a firm’s financial stance. Therefore
sound firms might want to borrow dollars and bear a high clearance cost, just in order to signal their type.
The success of this policy depends on the behavior of bad firms. When dollar borrowing clearance costs
are relatively small with respect to the clearance cost of borrowing in the local currency, the whole private
sector would opt for liability dollarization. In this case the signaling effect vanishes, while all firms bear
high clearance costs.
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RESUME :
L’article propose une explication à l’accumulation des dettes externes libellées en dollars par les PVD,
dans le cadre d’un modèle de signalisation. Par hypothèse, les banques n’ont aucun moyen direct de
déterminer la situation financière des firmes. Les firmes solides seraient tentées de s’endetter en dollars
moyennant des coûts administratifs élevés uniquement pour signaler leur type. Le succès d’une telle
politique dépend du comportement des firmes fragiles : si le coût administratif lié à l’emprunt en dollars
est faible, le secteur privé dans son ensemble peut choisir la dollarization. Dans ce cas, l’effet de signal
disparaît, tandis que toutes les firmes subissent des coûts administratifs élevés.
Mots-clés :
-  Péché originaire
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-  PVD
-  Dollarization des dettes
-  Equilibre Bayésien parfait
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In the early nineties, following the example of developed countries and the advice of main inter-
national ﬁnancial organizations, developing countries gradually removed barriers on international
movements of capital. In particular, their private sector was allowed to attract foreign savings. In
this context, many countries from Latin America, South-East Asia and Eastern Europe accumu-
lated public and private external debts that often exceed 30% of their GDP. Moreover, essentially
all the external debt of non-OECD countries is denominated in a foreign currency (in general, in
dollars).1
After the wave of ﬁnancial and exchange rate crises that hurt the developing world in the late
years (Mexico, Southeast Asia, Russia and Bulgaria, Argentina, etc.) economists start worrying
about risks that incurs a developing country which runs an important dollar debt, an imbalance
that is often referred to as the ”original sin” so as to emphasize its primordial role (Eichengreen
and Hausman, 1999). Various risks may be connected to a signiﬁcant dollar debt, in particular
if the international value of the local currency can slide down. Obviously, the local currency
depreciation would put additional strain on the debt service (Rogoﬀ, 1999; Calvo and Reinhart,
2002). Furthermore, when ﬁrm or bank assets are denominated in the local currency, currency
depreciation erodes their net worth; as a consequence, the corporate sector may put a brake on
investment, which in turn depresses global demand and would self-enforce a demand-driven crisis
(Krugman, 2000; Aghion et al., 2001; Jeanne and Zettlemeyer, 2002). Besancenot and Vranceanu
(2003) have shown that under extreme exchange rate volatility speciﬁct oc l e a nﬂoating, the non-
tradable sector may be vulnerable to illiquidity crises even if it runs only a small dollar debt.
If dollar debt is so dangerous, why did it spread so much? Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(2001) argue that many emerging economies can rely only on foreign investors since their domestic
ﬁnancial system is underdeveloped. In other line of argument, liability dollarization serves as
a commitment device. For instance, Calvo (2001) and Cowan and Do (2003) suggest that a
government may issue a dollar debt just to reveal its preferences for a stable exchange rate,
1 Many studies document on this surge in dollar denominated external private debts. See Rogoﬀ (1999), Calvo
(2001), Eichengreen and Hausman (1999), Eichengreen et al. (2002), Cowan and Do (2003), Ize and Yeyati (2003),
Reinhart et al. (2003).
1since any devaluation would impose a cost. The amount of dollar debt may even turn out to be
‘excessive’ if it prevents the central bank from implementing the ﬁrst best optimum monetary
policy. According to Jeanne (2000), borrowing in foreign currency is more dangerous for local
entrepreneurs since it increases the probability of terminating their activity; therefore, those who
borrow dollars have a strong incentive to provide a superior level of eﬀort; yet this strategy may
be optimal since lenders would agree on a lower interest rate.
The explanation provided in this paper builds on the signaling approach such as pioneered by
Spence (1973).2 We consider an emerging economy where the corporate sector is made up of
many ﬁrms of two distinct types, called “good” and “bad”. Bad ﬁrms present a higher probability
of default than the good ones. The local currency unit will be denoted ”peso”, and the foreign
currency will be denoted ”dollar”. For simplicity, it is assumed that the peso/dollar exchange
rate is irrevocably ﬁxed; this framework is a workable approximation for situations where the
government does not allow the exchange rate to ﬂuctuate too much. As Calvo and Reihnart,
(2002) have shown, this ”fear of ﬂoating” seems to be an ubiquitous characteristic of emerging
economies. Firms need to borrow one peso (or one dollar) per period to ﬁnance their activity.
Banks have no direct mean to ﬁnd out whether they face a high or low risk ﬁrm. This assumption
is not irrealistic. If banks face so many diﬃculties to asses the quality of Western companies (think
to typical cases like Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat), it is highly probable that the challenge
of determining the quality of a ﬁrm located in a developing country is even bigger.3 Yet all
banks have their speciﬁc lending procedure (involving ﬁle and documents processing, meetings,
etc.); complying with these administrative requirements entails a so-called ”clearance cost” for
the ﬁrm. The lending procedure of local banks implies a low clearance cost, which, to keep the
problem as simple as possible, is assumed to be identical for all ﬁrms, good or bad. In general,
dollar borrowing implies a higher clearance cost than peso borrowing. Furthermore, it is assumed
2 See also Spence (2002) for a comprehensive survey on signaling models.
3 Newspapers abound in comments on how diﬃcult is the task or rating agencies in the developing countries. For
instance, it seems that ”international credit rating companies charging into China are operating in such darkness
that many investors question the value of their work in the country” and that ”faulty accounting, poor corporate
governance and a lack of disclosure hamper the raters’ eﬀorts” (Joel Bagole, Credit-Rating work in China is Iﬀy
Business, Wall Street Journal, January 6, 2004).
2that the dollar clearance cost is higher for the bad ﬁrms than for the good ones.
This game presents a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which lenders’ beliefs and optimal bor-
rowing strategies of the ﬁrms are mutually consistent. Interest rates are endogenous; they reﬂect
the solvency risk perceived by the lenders given the observed debt policy. The nature of the
equilibrium depends on the relative size of various clearance costs. We put forward two pooling
equilibria in which all ﬁrms borrow in the same currency (i.e., either pesos or dollars), a sepa-
rating equilibrium where good ﬁrms borrow dollars and bad ﬁrms borrow pesos, and two hybrid
equilibria, one where all the bad and some good ﬁrms borrow pesos and one where all the good
and some bad ﬁrms borrow dollars.
In particular, a good ﬁrm may bear the higher clearance cost connected to dollar borrowing
only to signal its type, and hope to beneﬁt from a lower interest rate. Yet, under certain conditions,
bad ﬁrms may wish to take advantage of the lower interest rate speciﬁc to dollar borrowing and
accept bearing a high clearance cost too. This situation of full dollarization of liabilities is clearly
ineﬃcient, since the signaling eﬀect is absent, while all ﬁrms are subject to higher clearance costs
than in the peso pooling case.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the main assumptions
and describe the set of strategies and beliefs. Section 3 introduces the main equilibria and the
necessary conditions of existence. Conclusions are presented in Section 4.
2 The model
2.1 Basic assumptions
The model features a developing country where local ﬁrms ﬁnance themselves by borrowing from
local or foreign banks. The local currency unit is denoted peso, the foreign currency unit is denoted
dollar. For simplicity, it is assumed that one peso is worth one dollar. The exchange rate being
irrevocably ﬁxed, there is no exchange rate risk. Continuation of a ﬁrm’s productive activity for
one period requires either one peso, or one dollar (the ﬁrm cannot split the credit between two
currencies). Local bank lend pesos and foreign bank lend dollars.4
4 Calvo (1999) emphasizes that foreign banks have an institutional requirement to denominate their assets in
t h es a m ec u r r e n c ya st h e i rl i a b i l i t i e s .
3Firms diﬀer in their risk of default. To further simplify the analysis, is assumed that the set
of ﬁrms is made up of only two distinct types: the so-called b−firms (for “bad”), present a high
probability of default, πb; the others, called g − firms (for “good”), present a low probability of
default πg,w i t hπb > πg. The type t of a ﬁrm is therefore deﬁned according to the probability of
default, i.e. t ∈ {b,g}. The frequency of b−firmsis m, thus 1−m is the frequency of g−firms.
The lenders (banks) know the distribution of types in the total population of ﬁrms, but have
no direct mean to determine the probability of default of a potential client. To get a credit, ﬁrms
should comply with a lending procedure (ﬁle processing, formal and informal meetings, providing
documents), involving a so-called "clearance cost". This cost depends on the nature of the credit
(dollar or peso) and on the type of ﬁrm. It is assumed that:
a) borrowing dollars implies a higher clearance cost for a b − firm than for a g − firm;
b) borrowing pesos implies the same clearance cost, whatever the type of the ﬁrm;
c) the clearance cost related to peso borrowing is lower than the clearance costs related to
dollar borrowing.
Let the cN (the index N stands for national) denote the monetary equivalent of the clearance
cost related to peso borrowing and ct
$ the monetary equivalent of the clearance cost related to
dollar borrowing of a type t ﬁrm. The above mentioned conditions can then be written in the
compact form:




It should be emphasized that the clearance cost is a deadweight loss, whose signaling virtues
are only implicit, given the posited relationship between the “quality” of the ﬁrm and the costs
connected to the grant procedure. Banks may also ask for external certiﬁcation, ﬁnancial audit
reports and so on. In this model, these actions cannot reveal the ﬁrms’ type and may be considered
as a clearance cost; in other words, a bad ﬁrm could provide a good report provided that it spends
money and eﬀort to get a false statement.
Assumption (a) is thus crucial for the model. Assumption (b) was made only to keep the
model to its simplest form; the structure of the problem would not change if the clearance cost
of borrowing pesos were diﬀerent between b and g − firms, i.e. c
g
N <c b
N. Assumption (c) is a
4plausible conjecture; the opposite situation could be analyzed following the same methodology.
2.2 The strategy of the ﬁrm
From the ﬁrm’s point of view, two debt policies are feasible:
- borrow pessos (from a local bank); this policy is denoted by sN;
- borrow dollars (from a foreign bank); this policy is denoted by s$.
The set of policies is therefore {sN,s $}.
We deﬁne the strategy S of a ﬁrm as the choice of the best debt policy contingent upon its
type. The best policy minimizes the total borrowing cost.
2.3 Lenders’ strategy
Denoting by p (respectively q) the probability that lenders assign to a ﬁrm that borrows pesos








Let ρ ≥ 0 denote the risk free international interest rate and let ri be the interest rate required
for the debt policy si,w i t hi = {$,N}. To simplify calculus, we assume that in case of default,
the value of the debt becomes zero; in the context of developing countries, this assumption is not
probably very far from reality.
With risk-neutral lenders, the standard zero trade-oﬀ condition can be written:
(1 + ρ)=( 1+ri)(1 − Pr[default |si]), (3)
o r ,i na ne q u i v a l e n tf o r m :
1+ri =
1+ρ
1 − Pr[default |si]
. (4)
Lenders who observe a ﬁrm choosing si will asses the probability of default:
Pr[default |si]=P r [ default|t = b]Pr[t = b|si]+P r [ default|t = g]Pr[t = g|si]. (5)
More speciﬁcally, if the ﬁrm borrows pesos (sN), the contingent probability becomes:
Pr[default |sN]=πbp + πg(1 − p). (6)
5The interest rate required by the local bank (rN) is implicitly deﬁned by:
(1 + rN)=
(1 + ρ)
1 − πbp − πg(1 − p)
. (7)
If the ﬁrm borrows dollars (s$), the probability of default is:
Pr[default |s$]=πbq + πg(1 − q).
The interest rate on dollar debt (r$) is implicitly deﬁned by:
(1 + r$)=
(1 + ρ)
1 − πbq − πg(1 − q)
. (8)
Given these interest rates, and the existence of clearance costs connected to various forms of
borrowing, the overall cost of the debt is:
• (1 + cN)(1 + rN), for a ﬁrm borrowing pesos;
• (1 + ct
$)(1 + r$), with t ∈ {b,g}, for a ﬁrm borrowing dollars.
In other words, ﬁrms will borrow not only the one peso (or one dollar) directly related to the
productive activity, but also the resources necessary to cover the clearance cost.
3 Equilibria
An equilibrium exists if all ﬁrms implement their best policy given lenders’ beliefs Θ, and lenders’
beliefs are correct given S. This game presents several types of equilibria: separating, pooling and
hybrid, depending on whether the type of a ﬁrm can or cannot be inferred from the observed debt
policy.
3.1 Separating equilibrium
A separating equilibrium occurs if the borrowing policy unambiguously signals the type of the
ﬁrm. With two types of ﬁrms and two policies available, in a separating situation either good
ﬁrms borrow dollars and bad ﬁrms borrow pesos, or the reverse, good ﬁrms borrow pesos and bad
ﬁrms borrow dollars. It can be shown that the second situation is impossible (see Appendix). We
study hereafter the ﬁrst case.
If banks interpret the desire to borrow dollars as a signal that the ﬁrm is of the g −type (low
probability of default) and conversely, interpret the desire to borrow pesos as a signal that the








We study now under which conditions this system of beliefs is correct, that is under which condi-
tions s$ is the best policy of the g − firms and sN is the best policy of the b − firms.
Interest rates were deﬁned in equations (7) and (8). Given lenders’ beliefs, ﬁrms borrowing
pesos are asked an interest rate:
1+rN =
1+ρ
1 − πb. (9)
and ﬁrms borrowing dollars are required an interest rate:
1+r$ =
1+ρ
1 − πg. (10)
Remark that r$ <r N.
A b − firm, borrowing pesos, has no incentive to deviate from the sN policy if:









Let us denote by Cb ≡
(1+cb
$)
(1+cN), with Cb ≥ 1. Replacing in condition (12) interest rates such as
deﬁn e di n( 9 )a n d( 1 0 ) ,t h ec o n d i t i o nc a nb er e s t a t e da s :
Cb >
1 − πg
1 − πb. (13)
A g − firm, borrowing dollars, has no incentive to deviate from s$:
(1 + r$)(1 + c
g













(1+cN) > 1. Then condition (15) can be written:
Cg <
1 − πg
1 − πb. (16)
Denoting by δ ≡
1 − πg
1 − πb, where δ > 1, the separating equilibrium is feasible if (13) and (16) jointly
hold:
Cg < δ <C b. (CS)
7It should be emphasized that under our assumptions about the clearance costs (see Condition 1),
it comes out that
1 ≤ Cg <C b. (17)
3.2 Pooling equilibria
In a pooling situation all ﬁrms follow the same strategy, either s$ or sN; banks cannot infer the
ﬁrm’s type, and ask a single interest rate including an average risk premium.
3.2.1 Pooling Eq.1. All ﬁrms borrow dollars (undertake policy s$)
In an undiﬀerentiated situation, if lenders observe a ﬁrm which borrows dollars, it can assign a
probability m of facing a b − firm; we assume that they consider that a ﬁrm who borrows peso






Pr[t=b |s$]=q = m
.
The peso interest rate is:
1+rN =
1+ρ
1 − πb (18)
and the dollar interest rate:
1+r$ =
1+ρ
1 − πbm − πg(1 − m)
. (19)
We study now under which conditions this system of beliefs is correct. A b − firm, following
policy s$, has no reason to deviate if:
(1 + r$)(1 + cb
$) < (1 + rN)(1 + cN) (20)
⇔ Cb <
1 − πbm − πg(1 − m)
1 − πb (21)
A g − firm, following s$, will never deviate if:
(1 + r$)(1 + c
g
$) < (1 + rN)(1 + cN) (22)
⇔ Cg <
1 − πbm − πg(1 − m)
1 − πb . (23)
Given that Cg <C b, and denoting θ ≡
1 − πbm − πg(1 − m)
1 − πb , this equilibrium is feasible if:
Cb < θ. (CP_1)
5 It can be shown that the system of beliefs where banks think that a ﬁrm that borrows pesos is good cannot
be an equilibrium of this game.
83.2.2 Pooling Eq.2. All ﬁrms borrow pesos (follow sN)





Pr[t=b |sN]=p = m
Pr[t=b |s$]=q =0
.
A ﬁrm that borrows pesos may be bad with probability m, and good with probability 1 − m. If










1 − πg. (25)
The system of beliefs is correct under the following conditions. A b −firm which follows sN will
not deviate if:




1 − πbm − πg(1 − m)
. (27)
The g − firm which follows sN will not deviate if:





1 − πbm − πg(1 − m)
. (29)
Denoting by σ ≡
1 − πg
1 − πbm − πg(1 − m)
, with σ > 1, this equilibrium is feasible if:
Cg > σ (C_P2)
3.3 Hybrid equilibria
3.3.1 Hybrid Eq.1: all g − firms and some b − firms borrow dollars
In one possible hybrid equilibrium, all g − firms borrow dollars; af r a c t i o nα of the b − firms
borrow pesos (sN), while (1 −α) of the b −firms borrow dollars as well. In such an equilibrium











q =P r [ t=b |s$]=
Pr[s$|t=b]Pr[t=b]




(1 − α)m +( 1− m)
∈ [0,m]. (31)
We notice that q goes between 0 and m when α goes between 0 and 1.
Like in the previous cases, interest rates are:
1+rN =
(1 + ρ)




1 − πbq − πg(1− q)
(33)
In equilibrium, b−firmsshould have no incentive to deviate from their optimal policy; this implies
that costs of a b −firm following the sN policy are identical to costs of a b −firm following the
s$ policy:
(1+ rN)(1 + cN)=( 1+r$)(1 + cb
$) (34)









1 − πbq − πg(1 − q)
1 − πb (35)
or, for:
q =




The equilibrium exists if q ∈ [0,m]:




q<m ⇔ Cb >
1 − πbm − πg(1 − m)
1 − πb = θ. (38)
Let also check that a g − firm following the s$ policy has no interest to deviate:
(1 + r$)(1 + c
g
$) < (1+ rN)(1 + cN) (39)
⇔ Cg <
1 − πbq − πg(1 − q)
1 − πb = Cb. (40)
10The latter inequality is always true under our assumptions.
Therefore this equilibrium is possible if:
θ <C b < δ. (CH_1)
3.3.2 Hybrid Eq.2: all b − firms and some g − firms borrow pesos
We study now the feasibility of a hybrid equilibrium where all b−firmsfollow the sN policy, and










p =P r [ t=b |sN]=
Pr[sN|t=b]Pr[t=b]




m + λ(1 − m)
∈ [m,1]. (42)
Interest rates are then:
1+rN =
1+ρ





1 − πg. (44)
In equilibrium g − firms have no incentive to deviate from their policy; this is possible if
costs of the g −firms borrowing dollars are identical to costs of the g −firms borrowing pesos:
(1 + rN)(1 + cN)=( 1+r$)(1 + c
g
$),






1 − πg − p(πb − πg)
. (45)






11An equilibrium can be put forward if p ∈ [m,1]. This implies:
p>m ⇐⇒ Cg >
1 − πg
1 − πbm − πg(1 − m)
= σ (47)
p<1 ⇐⇒ Cg <
1 − πg
1 − πb = δ. (48)
We also check that no b − firm would deviate from the sN strategy:




1 − πg − p(πb − πg)
= Cg. (50)
This is always true under the initial assumptions.
Therefore, this equilibrium is feasible if:
σ <C g < δ. (CH_2)
4 A synthesis
Depending on the relative clearance costs Cb and Cg, a n do np a r a m e t e r sδ, σ and θ, one or several
of the equilibria may occur. The table here below summarizes the main ﬁndings:
Separating Only g − firms (b − firms) borrow dollars (pesos) Cg < δ <C b (CS)
Pooling 1 All ﬁrms borrow dollars Cb < θ (CP_1)
Pooling 2 All ﬁrms borrow pesos Cg > σ (CP_2)
Hybrid 1 Some b − firms also borrow dollars θ <C b < δ (CH_1)
Hybrid 2 Some g − firms also borrow pesos σ <C g < δ (CH_2)
We recall the deﬁnition of the critical thersholds:

      











It can be easily shown that δ > θ and that δ > σ. Then, we compare θ and σ :
σ =
(1 − πg)
1 − πbm − πg(1 − m)
<
1 − πbm − πg(1 − m)
(1 − πb)
= θ (52)









It can be noticed that f(0) > 0,f(1/2) > 0 and f(1) < 0. Hence, there is a root ˆ m ∈ [0.5,1], so
that for m<ˆ m then σ < θ and for m>ˆ m then σ > θ. We analyze more in depth the situation
where σ < θ (which would occur, for instance, if m =0 .5).7 In this case, the three parameters
can therefore be ranked:
1 < σ < θ < δ. (55)
The regioning is depicted in Figure 1, where Cg (Cb) is represented on the horizontal (vertical)
axis. Since Cb >C g, only the region above the 45◦ line will be considered. Given that Cg ≥ 1,
the origin is set at 1.
Figure 1: Various equilibria according to cleareance costs
From Figure 1 it comes out that for Cg ∈ [σ,δ] the game presents multiple equilibria, whatever
Cb.
7 The opposite case leads to rather similar conclusions and will not be developed here.
13The dollar pooling equilibrium, where all ﬁrms borrow dollars, is the single equilibrium possible
when the dollar clearance cost is relatively small compared to the peso clearance cost, i.e., if
Cb ∈]1,σ[. This situation has a less trivial interpretation. Consider a small developing country
which does not have an open capital market: obviously, all ﬁrms ﬁnance themselves by borrowing
resources from the local banks; the latter cannot diﬀerentiate between the good and the bad ﬁrms
so they consider an average probability of default [πbm + πg(1 − m)]. Let us suppose that the
country opens its capital account, and may freely borrow dollars from abroad. Foreign banks may
impose clearance costs related to a ﬁrm’s type. If these costs are small enough, the economy shifts
to complete dollarization of liabilities. Is this outcome eﬃcient? No: at the end of the journey all
ﬁrms pay the same interest rate as in the case of a closed capital account, but bear now higher
clearance costs. In addition, local banks were probably pushed out of the market by foreign banks.
The eﬃcient separating equilibrium can unambiguously occur if the clearance cost of dollar
borrowing by bad ﬁrms are relatively high and clearance costs of dollar borrowing by the good
ﬁrms are relatively low, i.e. if both Cb > δ and Cg < σ. Yet, risk neutral foreign banks may have
no interest in tuning clearance costs so as to achieve this equilibrium: while the average rentability
is identical to the dollar pooling case, the volume of credit is smaller.
As expected, if dollar borrowing clearance costs are high enough (Cb >C g > δ) all ﬁrms will
borrow only pesos.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In the last decade, the mix of external dollar denominated debt, perfect mobility of international
capital and sharp currency depreciation provided to be an extremely dangerous combination for
the developing world. Several economists who studied the last crises in Latin America and South-
east Asia, emphasized the primordial role played by the accumulation of large amounts of dollar
denominated external debt.
This paper aims at explaining why in a context of exchange rate stability and perfect mobility
of capital, emerging countries are prone to accumulate large dollars debts. The model is set up
in a signaling framework. Building on real life observation, it was assumed that banks (or rating
14agencies) have no direct means to infer information about the quality of a borrowing ﬁrm in a
developing country. However, borrowing dollars involve higher clearance (administrative) costs
than borrowing pesos (i.e., the local currency); in addition, the dollar borrowing clearance cost
depends on the ﬁnancial strength of the ﬁrm. In this case, a good ﬁrm might borrow dollars
only to signal its type: by so doing, it bears higher clearance costs, but would beneﬁtf r o ml o w e r
interest rates. Depending on the relative size of these clearance costs, the model presents various
equilibria.
If their speciﬁc clearance cost is not very large, bad ﬁrms will also borrow dollars, so as to
take advantage of the lower interest rates. In this equilibrium, the country falls into full liability
dollarization, and the signaling eﬀect vanishes. What appeared to be a favorable opportunity for
the good ﬁrms, turned into a sub-optimal situation for the economy as a whole. Furthermore, if
the same country shifts to a more ﬂexible exchange rate regime, it will be subject to additional
risks related to a would-be currency depreciation (e.g. a heavier debt burden, an adverse balance
sheet eﬀect, illiquidity).
The model also emphasizes the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for emergence of a separating
equilibrium with limited dollarization, where only good ﬁrms borrow dollars, while bad ﬁrms
borrow pesos. Whether this outcome can emerge or not depends on the relative clearance costs,
which are probably under the (imperfect) control of the foreign banks. If the latter are risk-neutral,
incentives to achieve this equilibrium can only be week.
The model could be generalized by relaxing some of the initial simplifying assumptions; for
instance, one may allow for peso clearance costs to vary between ﬁrms according to their ﬁnancial
quality, or for peso clearance costs to be higher than dollar clearance costs. The complexity of
the problem would increase but without altering the main insights. An interesting development
would allow for exchange rate ﬂuctuations. Despite its limitations, the model is interesting since it
provides, within a simple framework, an explanation for both the shared enthusiasm about dollar
borrowing and the disappointing ﬁnal outcome.
156 Appendix: the impossibility of another separating equi-
librium
We study whether a separating equilibrium where g −firms borrow pesos and b−firms borrow







This system of beliefs is correct if, in equilibrium, the best policy of g −firms is to borrow pesos




1 − πg (56)
and the interest rate on dollar credits is:
1+r$ =
1+ρ
1 − πb (57)
A g − firm which implements policy sN has no interest to deviate if:
(1 + rN)(1 + cN) < (1 + r$)(1 + c
g
$) ⇔ Cg >
1 − πb
1 − πg (58)
A b − firm which borrows dollars has no incentive to deviate if:
(1 + r$)(1 + cb
$) < (1 + rN)(1 + cN) ⇔ Cb <
1 − πb
1 − πg (59)




This separating equilibrium would be feasible if:
Cb < 1/δ <C g (60)
This is not possible, since 1/δ < 1 while Cb ≥ 1.
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